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APPLICATION OF THE CASH COLLATERAL
PARADIGM TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE
RIGHT TO SETOFF IN BANKRUPTCY
by
Jack F. Williams*
"I will admit if you start reading all of the bankruptcy law that you
reach a state of great intellectual confusion.""
Senator Ervin's comment carries no greater weight than in the area
of the interplay among setoff,1 the administrative freeze,2 and the auto-
* Associate, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas. George Washington University National Law
Center, J.D., 1985; United States Coast Guard Academy, University of Oklahoma, B.A., 1982. I wish
to thank William B. Finkelstein, Esq. and Stephen R. Voelker, Esq. for their comments on earlier
drafts of this article. I also wish to thank Marie Kenning, Diana Tunnell and Dorothy Beaver for
aiding in the preparation of this article. Without them, I would have been most assuredly lost.
This article was not prepared for or in contemplation of any matter in which my firm is or I am
counsel. Although I represent almost exclusively creditors (preferrably with a thin equity cushion), we
have represented parties on various sides of the issues discussed. See Douglas, Law Reviews and Full
Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 232 (1965). The views expressed are my own.
** Hearings on § 976 and § 1912 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
23 (1965) (remarks by Sen. Sam J. Ervin).
Setoff is a time-honored creditor's remedy whereby mutual debts may be "netted-out." Setoff
generally requires the creditor to take some overt action such as a debit to the debtor's account. The
genesis of the doctrine of setoff can be traced to Roman law and, although not a part of early English
common law, has been a part of American common law since the middle seventeenth century. See 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 553.0111] at 553-30 (15th ed. 1988). Setoff has also been a time-honored
part of the fabric of Jewish Law. See G. HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW § 258 at 479-80
(2d ed. 1973). As the Supreme Court of the United States cogently observed, the doctrine of setoff was
grounded on the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A. See Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank,
229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913).
' The administrative freeze means that a creditor has refused to allow a debtor access to the
debtor's funds in which the creditor claims a right to setoff permitted by state law and recognized by
the Code. Setoff generally requires that the creditor take some overt action in order to evidence, in an
objective manner, that a setoff has occurred. The administrative freeze, however, does not require an
overt act or even an intent to setoff. While the term "administrative freeze" implies that the creditor
has done something, taken some action, the debtor's complaint is truly that the creditor is not doing
something; the creditor is refusing to honor attempted withdrawals of the debtor's funds.
Both setoff and the freeze should be distinguished from recoupment. While setoff is a violation of
the automatic stay, recoupment is not. Recoupment is essentially unaffected by bankruptcy. See
Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 Bankr. 309, 313, 314 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). Recoupment is best charac-
terized as a defense to a debtor's claim rather than a mutual obligation. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1 553.03 at 553-13 (15th ed. 1988). Recoupment occurs when the mutuality of obligation arises out of
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matic stay in bankruptcy.3 Nowhere are the policies embodied in the
Bankruptcy Code4 for the protection of rights of debtors and creditors
more acutely in conflict. Cases exist holding that an administrative freeze
violates the automatic stay while an equal number of cases exist holding
that the administrative freeze does not violate the automatic stay. Does a
creditor violate the automatic stay by imposing an administrative freeze on
the debtor's funds held by that creditor? Should a creditor risk the possi-
bility of violating the stay to protect its right to setoff by effecting an
administrative freeze? There is no easy answer to this dilemma.
There are several Code provisions that affect the resolution of the
issue of whether the administrative freeze violates the automatic stay.
While this question has engendered many opinions, unfortunately, the
case law is hopelessly confused. This article explores the provisions of the
Code which are implicated when a creditor imposes an administrative
freeze on funds subject to setoff. This article discusses the administrative
freeze and distinguishes it from setoff. It then explores the analysis of
those cases which have permitted a freeze of the debtor's accounts and
those cases which have not. Finally, this article discusses the clashing pol-
icy rationales permeating the case law, attempting to discern the more
compelling logic.
I. AUTOMATIC STAY
Upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, a magical event occurs;
the omnipresent automatic stay arises.5 The stay is one of the fundamental
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. The reach of the au-
tomatic stay is virtually limitless. The scope of the stay is extremely
broad, proscribing almost any type of formal or informal action against
the same transaction or occurrence. Ashland Petrol. Co. v. Appel (In re B&L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d 155,
157-58 (10th Cir. 1986). When the mutuality of obligation arises out of the same transaction, then a
creditor may recoup its debt without fear of violating the automatic stay. Id.
* 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 82 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§
101-1330), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Bank-
ruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
554, 100 Stat. 3114 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); and,
Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified as
amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "Code"].
' See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). The automatic stay applies to all entities, which includes not
only traditional creditors but also governmental units and the United States Trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §
101(14) (1988); see generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.04 (15th ed. 1988).
[Vol. 7
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the debtor or the property of the estate. Among other actions, the auto-
matic stay prohibits the creditor's setoff of any prepetition claim.' The
automatic stay becomes effective upon the filing of a petition under the
Code, regardless of whether the debtor would suffer irreparable harm
without it.
7
The scope of the stay is extremely broad. It bars virtually all debt
collection efforts. There exist, however, several statutory exceptions to the
automatic stay.8 For example, criminal actions against the debtor, the col-
lection of alimony or support from property that is not property of the
estate, and action by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regula-
tory policies are excepted from the scope of the stay.9 Statutory exceptions
to the stay are strictly construed. 0
Section 362(c)(1) provides that the automatic stay automatically ter-
minates as to particular property when that property ceases to be "prop-
erty of the estate."11 If, for example, the bankruptcy trustee disposes of
part of the property of the estate and the sale is not free and clear of liens,
a creditor with a lien in the sold property may foreclose its lien. Further-
more, if a trustee abandons the property, it ceases to be property of the
estate."2 The automatic stay also terminates automatically when the bank-
ruptcy case is closed, dismissed, or the debtor receives or is denied a dis-
charge." A bankruptcy court may also order the earlier end of the auto-
matic stay: the court may terminate the automatic stay on request of a
party in interest for cause, or where the debtor has no equity in the prop-
erty and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization."
' 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (1988). "Claim" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988) to include:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliq-
uidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, se-
cured, or unsecured.
Minico Group of Cos., Ltd. v. First State Underwriters Agency of New England Reinsurance
Corp. (In re Minico Group of Cos., Ltd.), 799 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1986).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988).
' See id.
"0 Each of the exceptions to the automatic stay are based on necessity or public policy. See
generally 1 NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRAGTICE § 20.13 (1987).
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) (1988).
See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). Under §554(a), the trustee may abandon property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or of inconsequential value. Also, § 554(b) grants standing to a party
in interest to move to have the court order the trustee to abandon the property. It must be
remembered, however, that even though the property is no longer property of the estate, it neverthe-
less may be protected by the stay because it may remain property of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(c)(2) (1988).
1 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2) (1988).
14 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988). Section 362(g) imposes the burden of proof on the party opposing
1990]
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There are several purposes embodied in the automatic stay. A debtor
filing a bankruptcy petition needs immediate protection from the collec-
tion efforts of his creditors.15 A bankruptcy trustee or the debtor-in-pos-
session needs time to collect the property of the estate, administer estate
assets, and make pro rata distributions to creditors.'" Creditors need pro-
tection from other creditors bent on winning the "race to the courthouse"
or dismantling the debtor.' Accordingly, the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion automatically stays creditors from taking further action to collect or
enforce their claims. The purpose of the automatic stay, however, is not to
extinguish the rights of a creditor under state law.' 8
II. SETOFF UNDER STATE LAW
The Code preserves any nonbankruptcy right to setoff; it does not,
however, create any independent federal right to setoff.' 9 Thus, if a state
relief from the stay for all issues other than that of the debtor's equity in the property. See United
Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. 626, 632 (1988); see generally 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 362.10 (15th ed. 1988).
15 See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.01 (15th ed. 1988).
16 See Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc. (In re Fidelity Mortgage Investors),
550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977).
17 See Barclays Bank v. Saypol (In re Saypol), 31 Bankr. 796, 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
18 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6298. The automatic stay does not effect rights of creditors, but simply stays
enforcement of those rights pending orderly examination of the debtor's and creditor's rights. Profes-
sor Jackson, however, cogently notes that "[iln a liquidation proceeding, the 'automatic stay' affects a
creditor's substantive rights only until the assets are actually disbursed. [Citation omitted]. In a reor-
ganization proceeding, however, the deferral of substantive rights may last longer. [Citation omitted]."
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857,
872 n.70 (1982). The thrust of Professor Jackson's assertions is that it is rare for a secured creditor to
either be paid or be permitted to resort to his collateral at the inception of the bankruptcy proceeding.
Bankruptcy takes time. And time is, of course, lost value to the secured creditor. Section 361's purpose
is to ensure that the secured creditor receives that for which he had bargained. H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6295. But see
Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 635 (undersecured creditor is not entitled to lost opportunity cost resulting
from the stay of its right to foreclose). Thus, Professor Jackson correctly recognized that a secured
creditor's rights may be affected, but not abrogated, by the automatic stay.
Bankruptcy law has never purported to grant absolute recognition to state-created rights. The
stated policy of bankruptcy law has been to accord substantial respect to state rights unless they
conflict with federal policy and equitable principles. See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v.
Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161-63 (1946); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REv.
1013, 1035 (1953) ("apparent purpose" of the bankruptcy laws is to provide a system for the effectua-
tion of state-created rights); accord Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law In Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV.
953, 956 (1981).
'9 Passamano, Setoff in Bankruptcy: An Overview of the Mechanics, 105 BANKING L.J. 349
(1988); see generally COLLIER ON LENDING INSTITUTIONS AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 3.04[1]
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or federal statute prohibits setoff of certain debts, such as consumer debts,
the prohibition is carried forward into bankruptcy. The bitter necessarily
follows the sweet. Section 553(a) provides that the Code "does not affect
any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title
against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case." 2
Because the Code does not create any independent right of setoff, one
must review state law to assess whether a right to setoff exists at all. Tra-
ditionally, a right to setoff exists when the following four conditions are
met: (i) the fund to be set off is the property of the debtor; (ii) the fund is
deposited without restrictions; (iii) the existing indebtedness is due and
owing; and, (iv) there is a mutuality of obligation between the debtor and
the creditor, and between the debt and the fund on deposit.2 ' Setoff is thus
a method to net debts, usually arising out of unrelated transactions.
While state law is not uniform as to how one effects a right to setoff,
generally, the.courts have concluded that a creditor must take three steps
to effectuate its setoff right. First, the creditor must decide to exercise the
right to setoff. Second, the creditor must take some action which accom-
plishes the setoff. Third, the creditor must make some record which evi-
dences that the right to setoff has been exercised.22 While under the ma-
jority rule, the mere declaration of an intent to setoff is ineffective to
accomplish setoff, there are several jurisdictions where no overt act is nec-
essary. For example, in Pennsylvania, a bank's setoff automatically arises
once a debt matures.23 No further action by the bank is required.
A typical example of the right to setoff often arises in the traditional
bank/customer relationship. For example, a customer maintains a deposit
account at a bank. This relationship is traditionally viewed as a creditor/
debtor relationship. The customer then executes a promissory note, prom-
ising to pay the bank a sum of money. Upon the execution of the note, an
additional customer/bank relationship exists. In this relationship the cus-
tomer is the debtor, the bank is the creditor. If the customer defaults on
(1986).
,0 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1988).
1' See FDIC v. Pioneer State Bank, 155 N.J. Super. 381, 390, 382 A.2d 958, 962 (1977); see
also Baker v. Nat'l City Bank, 511 F.2d 1016, 1018 (6th Cir. 1975).
22 See Baker, 511 F.2d at 1018; Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff: Avoiding the Pitfalls, 98 BANK-
ING L.J. 196, 255 (1981).
"' Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. United States, 657 F.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania
recognizes the doctrine of automatic setoff).
1990]
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the promissory note, the bank's right to setoff arises. The customer is the
bank's creditor in relation to the deposit account, but is also a debtor in
relation to the promissory note. The bank is a creditor as to the promis-
sory note, but is a debtor as to the deposit account. Mutuality of obliga-
tion exists. The conditions necessary for the right to setoff are all present.
III. SETOFF UNDER THE CODE
While the Code does not create any right to setoff, it does delineate
the procedure by which a creditor can exercise its nonbankruptcy setoff
right.24 Assuming that a right to setoff exists under state law, there re-
mains the question of the extent of the effect that the Code has on that
setoff right.
Section 553 of the Code provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363
of this title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mu-
tual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against the claim of such creditor
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case, except to
the extent that-
(1) the claim of such creditor against the debtor is disallowed other
than under section 502(b)(3) of this title;
(2) such claim was transferred, by an entity other than the debtor, to
24 See Weintraub & Resnick, Freezing The Debtor's Account: A Banker's Dilemma Under The
Bankruptcy Code, 100 BANKING L.J. 316, 317 (1983). In recognizing the right to setoff in certain
circumstances, § 553 recognizes the possible injustice that may result in compelling a creditor to
forego setoff rights, file a proof of claim, and turn over the funds in the creditor's possession. For
example, assume that a creditor owes its debtor $100,000, and the debtor owes the creditor $100,000.
All other factors remaining constant, under state law the creditor can setoff the mutual debts and owe
nothing to the debtor. If, however, the Code fails to recognize the creditor's setoff right, then a re-
markable injustice occurs. The creditor must turn over the $100,000 to the debtor's estate. See 11
U.S.C. § 542(b) (1988). The creditor would then be entitled to file a proof of claim. Assuming that
the estate pays a dividend of ten percent, the creditor would receive $10,000. See 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 553.02 at 553-10 (15th ed. 1988). So what says Professor McCoid. See McCoid,
Setoff: Why Bankruptcy Priority?, 75 VA. L. REv. 15 (1989). After noting that setoff is preferential in
effect, Professor McCoid addresses each of the proffered justifications for the special treatment of
setoff by the Code. See generally id. at 19-41. He quickly disspels the quaint notion that setoff is
grounded on "natural justice and equity," see id. at 19-26, by recognizing the basis cuts against
creditor equality and is unsupported by a creditor inter se model. Id. at 43. Professor McCoid then
turns to the contemporary rationale for setoff's exalted role: security. Id. at 29-39. He successfully
discounts this justificaion, especially where the mutuality of indebtedness arises out of entirely differ-
ent transactions. Id. at 37-38. Although Professor McCoid offers no empirical evidence that failure to
recognize the secured priority of setoff would not increase the cost of credit, his discussion that it




(A) after the commencement of the case; or
(B)(i) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) while the debtor was insolvent; or
(3) the debt owed to the debtor by such creditor was incurred by such
creditor-
(A) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
(B) while the debtor was insolvent; and
(C) for the purpose of obtaining the right of setoff against the
debtor.
(b)(1) Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in sections
362(b)(6), 362(b)(7), 365(h)(2) or 365(i)(2), of this title, if a creditor offsets
a mutual debt owing to the debtor against a claim against the debtor on or
within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition, then the trustee
may recover from such creditor the amount so offset to the extent that any
insufficiency on the date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency on the
later of-
(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date
of the filing of the petition on which there is an insufficiency.
(2) In this subsection, "insufficiency" means amount, if any, by which
a claim against the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the
holder of such claim.
(c) For purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been insol-
vent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing
of the petition.25
Only mutual debts may be set off under Section 553(a). A debt is consid-
ered mutual when it is between the same parties in the same right or
capacity.26 The debts need not, and usually do not, arise out of the same
S5 section 553 is the appropriate rubric in which to gauge the right to setoff. Therefore, the'
trustee cannot attack a prepetition setoff under the general preference provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 547
(1988). See In re Hinson, 65 Bankr. 675, 677 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986). Moreover, setoff was
deleted from the term "transfer" as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988).
' Under 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988), the mutuality requirement is strictly construed. Virginia Block
Co. v. Bushong (In re Virginia Block Co.), 16 Bankr. 560, 562 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981). For exam-
ple, a debt due an individual general partner cannot be setoff against a claim of the partnership or a
debt due a corporation against a claim of its wholly-owned subsidiary. Id. Equally true, a creditor of
a corporation cannot setoff funds in the personal account of the president of the corporation. Accord
England v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah (In re Visiting Home Servs., Inc.), 643 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir.
1981). It would appear that the question of the existence of mutuality is a matter of state law. E.g.,
Straughair v. Palmieri (In re Palmieri), 31 Bankr. 111, 112 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983). Moreover, the
broad definitions of "claim" and "debt" generally permit setoffs of contract and tort claims because
1990]
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transaction. "7 Section 553 requires that both the funds and the debt arise
prior to the filing of the petition.28
Section 553 affects both the prepetition and post-petition exercise of
setoff. Under Section 553, a setoff may be attacked if effected on or within
ninety-days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Therefore, where a
creditor effects a setoff more than ninety-days before the petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed, the trustee cannot attack the setoff. 9 However, if a creditor
effects a setoff within ninety-days of bankruptcy, while the debtor is pre-
sumed insolvent, and if it can be proved that the deposit was made for
purposes of obtaining a right to setoff, the setoff is voidable by the trustee
under Section 553(a)(3)."0
The Code modifies prior law dramatically in granting the trustee
power to void a setoff exercised within ninety-days of bankruptcy, not
only where deposits have been built up with an intent to exercise setoff,
but also where there has been an improvement in position by the creditor
within the ninety-day period. 1 Under Section 553(b), the trustee may
void a setoff to the extent that an insufficiency existing at the date of setoff
mutuality does not require a similarity of obligations. See Waste Management v. Barry Parker's, Inc.
(In re Barry Parker's, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 115, 117 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); see generally Annotation, Right
to Set Off Tort Claim and Contract Claim Against One Another Under § 68(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 34 A.L.R. FED. 579 (1977).
2' This fact distinguishes setoff from recoupment. For an explanation of the distinction between
setoff and recoupment, see supra note 2. A creditor cannot effect a setoff when it has notice that an
account is dedicated to a special use. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 553.04 at 553-22 (15th ed.
1988). For example, a bank generally cannot exercise a setoff against a debtor's payroll account. See,
e.g., Sisk v. Saugus Bank and Trust Co. (In re Saugus Gen. Hosp., Inc.), 698 F.2d 42, 46-47 (1st
Cir. 1983). Moreover, under § 553(a)(2), no setoff is allowed against claims transferred to the creditor
from a party other than the debtor (i) after the case is commenced or (ii) within ninety-days prior to
the filing of the petition, i.e., while the debtor was insolvent. The provision is intended to discourage
the purchase of third-party claims at a discount shortly before bankruptcy in order to take undue
advantage of the right of setoff. See generally CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 6.05121[a] (2d ed. 1988).
2 To be eligible for setoff, both the mutual claim of the creditor and the debt of the debtor must
have arisen prior to the commencement of the case. Claims arising after the commencement of the case
lack the requisite mutuality for setoff because the post-petition trustee or debtor-in-possession is re-
garded as a different entity from the prepetition debtor. See, e.g., Local Unions v. Brada Miller
Freight Sys., Inc. (In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d 890, 894 (11th Cir. 1983); In re
Springfield Casket Co., 21 Bankr. 223, 228 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). Interestingly, § 553 is silent
regarding the setting off of mutual post-petition obligations.
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). See also CLARK, supra note 27, 1 6.0512][a].
3o Section 553(a)(3) is a general codification of the case law under § 68 of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). The purpose of this provision is to prevent the creditor
from using its common law right to setoff in an unfair manner. See CLARK, supra note 27, 1
6.0512][a] at 6-62.
U 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988).
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is less than an insufficiency existing on the later of: (1) the first day of the
ninety-day period; or, (2) the first day within that period on which an
insufficiency existed.3 ' The "insufficiency" relates to the extent to which
the amount owed by a debtor exceeds the amount owed to that debtor.3
Significantly, the power to recover under Section 553(b) is absolute; the
power does not hinge on the insolvency of the debtor. 4
Of great significance is the fact that the improvement in position rule
under Section 553(b) only applies to prepetition setoff. Thus, mere im-
provement of a creditor's position is not voidable by the trustee when the
creditor does not setoff prior to bankruptcy.35 The creditor who rolls the
dice and refrains from prepetition setoff can ride the tide of any increase
in the debtor's funds. The dual standard between the treatment by the
Code of prepetition and post-petition setoff reflects a policy to discourage
prepetition setoff, thus maintaining a source of working capital for the
debtor's reorganization.3
The Code treats the right to setoff as a secured claim to the extent of
the funds subject to setoff on the date the bankruptcy petition is filed.3 7
For example, if a creditor possesses funds of the debtor of $1,000 and the
debtor owes the creditor $2,000, the Code treats the creditor as holding a
secured claim to the extent of $1,000 and an unsecured claim to the extent
of $1,000.
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988). An example may help to clarify this method. Assume that the
debtor owes a bank $100,000 on January 1, and the debtor maintains a deposit account balance of
$50,000 on that date. The bank exercises setoff on March 8, at a time when the debtor's account
balance is $75,000. The debtor files its bankruptcy petition on April 1. Result: The bank will be
allowed to retain $50,000 under § 553. However, if the bank refrained from exercising setoff, it would
have possessed a secured claim valued at $75,000. Accord Exxon Corp. v. Compton Corp. (In re
Compton Corp.), 22 Bankr. 276, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
s 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2) (1988). The improvement in position test does not apply to setoffs
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), 362(b)(7), 365(h)(2) & 365(i)(2) (1988). The improvement in position
rule codified in § 553(b) is similar to that governing security interests in accounts and inventory under
§ 547(c)(5). See 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(5) (1988). With setoff, as opposed to the requirements under 9
547(c)(5), the trustee need not show that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the improvement of
position. See In re Hinson, 65 Bankr. 675, 677 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986). Moreover, unlike § 553,
the trustee can only reach back ninety-days; there is no one year insider period like that found in §
547. See CLARK, supra note 27, T 6.0512][a] at 6-63.
" For a practical exercise in the nuances of § 533, see Passamano, supra note 19, at 352-54.
" See, e.g., In re Compton Corp., 22 Bankr. at 278.
t See CLARK, supra note 27, 6.05[2][a] at 6-64. "The bank may gain by delaying setoff until
after bankruptcy because it may ultimately recover the greater portion of its claim than it would
otherwise due to the 'adequate protection' provisions of sections 361 and 361(e) and because the
improvement-in-position restrictions of section 553(b) will not apply." 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1
553.15 at 553-60 - 553-61 (15th ed. 1988).
"' 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
19901
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The right to setoff under the Code is fragile and can be easily waived
by the creditor. Failure to assert in a timely manner the setoff right, 8
failure to stop payment of prepetition checks by a bank claiming a right to
setoff,3 9 or failure to assert any setoff rights in a proof of claim40 may
result in the court concluding that the creditor has waived any setoff
rights it may have had. Moreover, the courts have held that the right to
setoff under Section 553 is permissive.41 Consequently, a court may theo-
retically deny setoff, even if the elements of Section 553 have been met.42
While Section 553 permits the creditor to exercise its rights to setoff,
the right is subject to Section 362, the automatic stay provision of the
Code. A creditor must obtain relief from the bankruptcy court before ex-
ercising its right to setoff; failure to do so exposes the creditor to the risk
that its setoff may be invalidated and that it may be sanctioned for violat-
ing the automatic stay.4
IV. CASE LAW ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE FREEZE
Whether the administrative freeze violates the automatic stay is an
issue which has engendered much judicial debate. While the cases can be
loosely grouped into those cases which permit a creditor to exercise an
administrative freeze and those cases which do not, such artificial distinc-
" See Holder v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 49 Bankr. 19, 21 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
3' See Lowden v. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 10 F. Supp. 430, 433-34 (S.D.
Iowa 1935), affd, 84 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 584 (1936).
" See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 553.07 at 553-38 & n.5 (15th ed. 1988).
41 See, e.g., Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399, 1404 (6th Cir. 1984)
("[Sletoffs are generally favored, but are not automatically permitted. The allowance of a setoff is
within the discretion of the trial court and its decision on the matter will not be set aside unless found
to constitute a clear abuse of discretion."); FDIC v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 701 F.2d
831, 836 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983). However, one court has stated:
The rule allowing setoff, both before and after bankruptcy, is not one that courts are free
to ignore when they think application would be "unjust." It is a rule that has been embod-
ied in every bankruptcy act the nation has had and creditors, particularly banks, have long
acted in reliance upon it.
N.J. Nat'l Bank v. Gutterman (In re Applied Logic Corp.), 576 F.2d 952, 957-58 (2d Cir. 1978).
42 Melamed, 727 F.2d at 1404. There appears to be little logic in such an approach. The hostili-
ties voiced by courts in this context are hostilities better placed at the foot of state law. It appears that
the genesis of this doctrine can be traced to the belief that a setoff right is a windfall. However, this is
not so. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
43 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1988). Actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. Kalb v.
Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 443 (1940); Caribbean Food Products, Inc. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro
Ponceno, 575 F.2d 961 (1st Cir. 1978). Section 362(h) provides for the recovery of damages, costs,
and attorneys' fees by an individual damaged by a willful violation of the stay. In the appropriate
case, punitive damages may also be recovered. For a general discussion of § 362(h), see 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1 362.12 (15th ed. 1988).
19901 Cash Collateral Paradigm
tions cannot help but mask many subtle issues. The following is a review
of the many cases exploring the issue.
A. Cases Holding that the Freeze Violates the Stay
The cases which have determined that an administrative freeze ef-
fected to preserve a creditor's setoff right violates the automatic stay pos-
sess a common thread. The common thread is an emphasis on the role
that the Code plays in providing a safe haven, often temporary, for debt-
ors to effectuate a plan of reorganization. Typically, these cases discuss in
great detail the noble purposes embodied in the automatic stay.
The case generally recognized as the first case to hold that an admin-
istrative freeze violates the automatic stay is In re Kenney's Franchise
Corporation." The precise issue in Kenney's Franchise I was whether
the bank's freeze of the debtor's checking account upon learning that a
Chapter 11 case had been filed constituted a setoff in violation of the auto-
matic stay." The debtor argued that the administrative freeze was tanta-
mount to a setoff, thus violating the automatic stay. The bank, however,
argued that it possessed a "banker's lien"" upon the account and that it
had the right to hold or freeze the funds until the court granted it ade-
quate protection pursuant to Section 362(d). Essentially, the bank argued
that the funds were cash collateral' 7 and were thus cloaked with the pro-
tections afforded by Section 363(c)(2)."
" Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, N.A. (In re Kenney's Franchise Corp.),
12 Bankr. 390 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981) (hereinafter Kenney's Franchise 1), rev'd, 22 Bankr. 747
(W.D. Va. 1982) (hereinafter Kenney's Franchise I). Kenney's Franchise I is an anomoly of sorts in
that while the case is frequently cited as the first case to hold that an administrative freeze violates the
automatic stay, the case was reversed on appeal by the district court.
" Kenny's Franchise I, 12 Bankr. at 391.
46 While several courts and commentators have scoffed at the term "banker's lien" in reference to
setoff, with the expanded definition of the term "lien" in § 101(33), one can advance the argument
that a setoff right may be a lien under the Code. Cf 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 553.15 at 553-61.
(15th ed. 1988) (posing the proposition, but abandoning it).
"' Cash collateral includes:
cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash
equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the estate have
an interest and includes the proceeds, products, offsprings, rents, or profits of property
subject to a security interest as provided in § 552(b) of this title, whether existing before or
after the commencement of the case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988). The definition of cash collateral is inclusive and will operate without
regard to the source of the cash collateral. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 363.02 (15th
ed. 1988).
48 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1988) provides:
(1) If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated under section 721, 1108, 1304,
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Before reaching its conclusion, the court painstakingly explored the
purposes and effect of the automatic stay. The court observed that the
automatic stay precluded a creditor from the act of setoff.49 The court also
observed that the language of the stay provision was broad and all encom-
passing, admitting of no exceptions other than those explicitly contained
in Section 362(b) which, the court observed, did not authorize setoff.5"
Further, the court correctly noted that the bank's supposed banker's lien
was no more than the common law right to setoff."' Not leaving well
enough alone, the court then concluded that the right to setoff under prior
law did not rise to the level of a security interest. Implicit in the court's
conclusion is that if the right to setoff is not a security interest, then it
cannot be a secured claim. This conclusion was reached without discus-
sion of Section 506(a), which provides secured status to a setoff right to
the extent of funds held by the creditor subject to setoff.52 Failure to dis-
cuss this relevant section must necessarily result in a discounting of the
1203 or 1204 of this title and unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may enter into
transactions, including the sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of
business, without notice or a hearing, and may use property of the estate in the ordinary
course of business without notice or a hearing.
(2) The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of this
subsection unless-
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in accor-
dance with the provisions of this section.
(3) Any hearing under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection may be a preliminary hearing
or may be consolidated with a hearing under subsection (c) of this section, but shall be
scheduled in accordance with the needs of the debtor. If the hearing under paragraph (2)
(B) of this subsection is a preliminary hearing, the court may authorize such use, sale, or
lease only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the trustee will prevail at the final hearing
under subsection (e) of this section. The court shall act promptly on any request for au-
thorization under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection.
(4) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the trustee shall segregate and
account for any cash collateral in the trustee's possession, custody, or control.
"' Kenney's Franchise I, 12 Bankr. at 391.
50 Id. at 391-92.
"I Id. at 392.
52 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or the
extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the
extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than
the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose
of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
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persuasiveness of the court's holding.
One cannot help but believe that regardless of what the Code explic-
itly states or what counsel may have argued, the Kenney Franchise I
court's position was that the right to setoff was not a secured claim at
common law and thus could not be a secured claim under the Code. The
court, however, was wrong. Under Section 506(a), a creditor with a claim
based on the right to setoff possesses a secured claim. The language of
Section 506(a) leaves no room for debate. Nevertheless, the Kenney's
Franchise I court embraced a generous adherence to the automatic stay
provision in reaching its decision that the bank had violated the automatic
stay imposed by Section 362(a)(7). This conclusion was, in effect, so gen-
erous that it squeezed out the impact of Section 506(a).
A peculiar analysis can be found in In re Executive Associates,
Inc.,"3 where the court held that a freeze on the debtor's funds violated
the automatic stay." The court was impressed with the havoc a freeze
could wreak on a debtor's attempt to reorganize its business. 55 Interest-
ingly, the creditor argued that without the freeze the debtor could use the
funds, which constitute cash collateral, without providing adequate protec-
tion.56 The court dismissed the creditor's contention, observing that it was
not ruling on the Section 363 cash collateral issue because the creditor had
failed to prove the value of the funds on deposit at the time the petition
was filed, i.e., the value of the creditor's secured claim. 57 A fair reading of
the court's opinion leads one to a peculiar observation. While the court
would not countenance the freeze, it would allow a creditor to refuse to
permit its debtor to use funds subject to setoff under Section 553, unless
the debtor provided adequate protection. If this is the case, a creditor in
that district can refuse to consent to the use of funds legitimately subject to
setoff, but cannot freeze the account. One may ask what distinction can be
drawn here. Unfortunately, the use of the term "freeze" implies that the
creditor has taken some action beyond merely failing to consent to the use
of the funds. While it is true that the creditor typically makes some record
that the funds are not to be withdrawn, the debtor's true complaint is that
53 Exec. Assoc., Inc. v. Southern Nat'l Bank (In re Exec. Assoc., Inc.), 24 Bankr. 171 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1982).
"' Id. at 172. Accord LHG Resources, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re LHG Resources, Inc.),
34 Bankr. 202, 203 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983).
" In re Exec. Assoc., Inc., 24 Bankr. at 172.
" Id. at 172-73.
57 Id.
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the creditor is refusing to consent to the use of those funds." In re Execu-
tive Associates notwithstanding, a refusal to consent to the use of cash
collateral is tantamount to a freeze. If one is suspect, it necessarily follows
that the other must be as well. Logic and experience tell one, however,
this is not the case.
In United States v. Norton,5 9 the Third Circuit concluded that an
IRS freeze of a tax refund due a Chapter 13 debtor violated the spirit of
the automatic stay. Again, after carefully discussing the purposes of the
automatic stay and the goals of bankruptcy, specifically in the Chapter 13
scenario, the court had little difficulty in finding that the automatic stay
prevented an IRS freeze. The court was impressed by the fact that if a
bank could freeze the debtor's accounts upon the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy, the debtor's chances for a successful rehabilitation would be
substantially diminished. 0
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code ... is designed to encourage and make
possible the payment, rather than the discharge of debts. The automatic
stay protects debtors from their creditors and creditors from themselves
while a repayment plan is developed. If a creditor could circumvent the
automatic stay simply by delaying the entry of a setoff or credit in its books,
it could hold the funds until the case was closed and then deposit them into
its own bank account. By the unilateral action of one creditor, these funds
would become unavailable for distribution to other creditors or for use by
the debtor in a Chapter 13 plan, thus making it that much less likely that
the debtor could be rehabilitated."'
The court, moreover, was not persuaded by the IRS' argument that the
automatic stay provisions of the Code were not meant to modify a credi-
tor's rights, but simply to stay their enforcement pending an orderly ex-
5 As observed in Stann v. Mid Am. Credit Union, 39 Bankr. 246, 248 (D. Kan. 1984), "[tlhe
administrative freeze is not an attempt to collect a debt, [but rather] it is an act to maintain the status
quo until the rights of the parties can be determined by the bankruptcy court."
59 717 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1983). There appears to be an unusual amount of Pennsylvania cases
on this issue. E.g., Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank (In re Cusanno), 17 Bankr. 879, 882 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982) (under state law, "administrative hold" on the debtor's account is a setoff, and setoff pursuant
to § 553 of the Code is expressly subject to the automatic stay under § 362(a)(7)); In re Cross Keys
Motors, Inc., 19 Bankr. 976, 977 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982) ("The setoff of any debt owing to a debtor
that arose before the commencement of a case under this title against any claim against the debtor is
specifically prohibited"); as well as the cases discussed in this article.
60 Norton, 717 F.2d at 773.
61 Id.
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amination of the debtor's affairs.62 The court dismissed this argument,
observing that even creditors whose claims are secured under the Code
must submit to the risk inherent in the judicial suspension of the rights
they normally would have to enforce their claims against property of the
debtor.03 Conspicuously absent in the court's discussion was any reference
to adequate protection.
The Norton case is questionable precedent in light of the emphasis
placed by the Third Circuit on the law of setoff in Pennsylvania. 4 The
IRS argued that, because it had not applied the amount of the tax refund
withheld, it had not actually setoff the funds; rather, it had merely pre-
served its right to setoff. Under Pennsylvania law, however, setoff occurs
at the time sufficient evidence of intent to setoff is manifested. 5 There is
no requirement that a book entry or some other written evidence be made.
The mere fact of denying a debtor access to its funds constitutes setoff.6
Consistent with Pennsylvania law then, the court ruled that the IRS with-
holding of the debtor's refund was sufficient evidence of intent to setoff. In
deferring to state law, the court reasoned that the freeze was not merely
tantamount to a setoff, but was, in fact, a setoff and a setoff was clearly
prohibited by the automatic stay. Nevertheless, two principles that the
Norton case stands for, which are not tainted by the peculiarities of Penn-
sylvania law, are the court's adherence to a generous reading of the auto-
matic stay provision, seen earlier in Kenney's Franchise I, and the laud-
ing of the underlying policy provisions relevant to a bankruptcy
reorganization case.
A case which closely follows the rationale of the Norton case is
United States v. Reynolds,6" which held that the imposition of a freeze by
the IRS to protect its right to setoff violated the automatic stay.6 8 The
court embraced the Norton analysis, noting that the analysis rested on the
policies embodied in the Code relating to the reorganization of the
62 Id.
13 Id. See also supra note 18.
61 See supra note 59.
' Norton, 717 F.2d at 772.
" Pennsylvania law on setoff states that setoff automatically occurs when the "atmospheric con-
ditions" for setoff arise; no overt act is necessary. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. United States, 657 F.2d
36, 38-39 (3d Cir. 1981) (setoff occurs by operation of law). Thus, a freeze appears to be the same
thing as a setoff under Pennsylvania law. The Pennsylvania view on what constitutes a setoff is not
the majority view. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 553.17 at 553-79 n.3 (15th ed. 1988).
17 764 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985).
48 Id. at 1006-07.
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debtor."9 The Reynolds court held that in the absence of Virginia law on
the issue of what constitutes a setoff, the court should employ the Norton
reorganization rationale as justification for concluding that a freeze of
funds violates the automatic stay.70 When the Reynolds court stated that
there was no Virginia law on the freeze issue,71 it was mistaken. In Ken-
ney's Franchise II,7 the court held that the imposition of a freeze to pro-
tect a creditor's setoff right was not proscribed by the automatic stay. Cen-
tral to the holding in Kenney's Franchise H was the court's conclusion
that setoff in Virginia, unlike in Pennsylvania, requires an application of
the debtor's funds to the indebtedness, i.e., some overt act evidencing the
setoff.7 Inexplicably, the Reynolds court ignored Kenney's Franchise I.
In In re Rio, 4 the court held that an administrative freeze imposed
by a credit union on a Chapter 13 debtor's checking account after the
credit union received notice of the Chapter 13 petition was tantamount to
a setoff, thus violating the automatic stay.75 In In re Rio, the credit union
contended that the funds on deposit were cash collateral subject to the
restrictions of Section 362(c)(2). Therefore, the credit union argued, it
was entitled to deny access to the funds absent a court order granting the
debtor the right to use the funds. The court was unpersuaded.
[Section] 363(c)(2) is applicable only where the debtor has been authorized
to operate a business. (citation omitted] The debtor in this case is not en-
gaged in operating a business and no authority to engage in business has
been requested or granted.7 1
In holding that the administrative freeze was tantamount to a setoff and
thus violated the automatic stay, the court embraced the dissenting opinion
in In re Edgins.77 In a cryptic syllogism, the In re Rio court stated:
6. Id. at 1007. The Reynolds court also observed that the Norton analysis was supported by the
peculiarities of Pennsylvania law. Id.
70 Id. In reaching its conclusion that the imposition of a freeze violated the stay, the court was
impressed with the fact that the debtor's Chapter 13 plan provided payment in full in addition to
adequate protection for the IRS. Id. at 1007-1008. I believe another, more accurate way to under-
stand this case is that the debtor purchased the right to use the funds subject to setoff by providing
adequate protection to the IRS.
71 Id. at 1007.
'" 22 Bankr. 747 (W.D. Va. 1982).
73 Id. at 748.
"' 55 Bankr. 814 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1985).
75 Id. at 817.
76 Id.
7" Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Edgins (In re Edgins), 36 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. 9th
[Vol. 7
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The dissent in that case [Edgins] reasoned that under [Section] 524(b) an
entity is required to turn over property of the debtor except to the extent it
is subject to being off setoff under [Section] 553. The setoff in [Section] 553
is clearly subject to the automatic stay of [Section] 362(a)(7). The act of
freezing an account is tantamount to a setoff and is also stayed by [Section]
362(a)(7). The proper remedy of the bank was to seek relief from the [sic]
stay. 7
8
The second argument advanced by the credit union was that it was
entitled to adequate protection as a prerequisite to being required to re-
lease the funds." The court held that adequate protection under Section
363(e) is available only to an entity having a security interest in property
of the estate. The court dodged the question of whether the credit union
had a security interest in the funds by stating, without analysis, that
where an entity is promised payment in full by the Chapter 13 plan, then
its secured or unsecured status is irrelevant."0 This result was reached
even though the plan provided for full payment over a period of time
without adequate protection.8"
In a facially persuasive opinion, the court in In re Wildcat Construc-
tion Co., observed, in dicta, that a bank's refusal, prior to a judicial
determination of the rights of the parties, to honor checks and permit
withdrawals from the bank accounts of the debtor-in-possession violated
the automatic stay."' The court observed that regardless of whether freez-
ing a bank account is a setoff or tantamount to a setoff, it is an unautho-
rized interference with the property of the Chapter 11 debtor without
leave of the court.8 ' The court further rejected the bank's argument based
on Section 506(b) as an independent ground for freezing the bank
accounts.
Indeed, perhaps the most fundamental problem with countenancing the
freezing of the debtor's bank accounts before any judicial determination of
the rights of the parties has been made is that it begs the critical question,
assuming in advance the precondition for its validity. This position converts
Cir. 1984).
"8 In re Rio, 55 Bankr. at 817-18.
71 Id. at 817.
:0 Id.
*t Id.
81 57 Bankr. 981 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).




a bank's potential right to setoff into an allowed claim at the outset. These
courts "seem to assume that the bank has the right to make the initial de-
termination of which bank accounts are cash collateral which the debtor
may not use. . . ." [citation omitted] The freeze is essentially an extra-
judicial temporary restraining order. We must not delegate to one of the
parties the judicial responsibility of deciding whether the funds in the ac-
count are cash collateral and of enforcing the statutory prohibition against
using such cash collateral.8 5
The court noted that left to its own devices, an interesting result occurs
under the Code. Both the bank and the Chapter 11 debtor are frozen in
place: the bank by the automatic stay, the debtor by the prohibition
against using cash collateral without consent of the creditor or order of the
court.8"
Much like the court in Kenney's Franchise I, the Wildcat court's
analysis relied primarily on a generous interpretation of Section
362(a)(7). Additionally, the Wildcat court also relied on the 1984 amend-
ments to Section 362. Section 362(a)(3) provides that the automatic stay
prohibits "[a]ny act . . . to exercise control over property of the estate."
Property of the estate is defined in Section 541(a)"7 to include all legal
and equitable interests of the debtor. Arguably, Section 362(a)(3) provides
support for the proposition that a creditor's freezing of the debtor's ac-
count is a violation of the automatic stay. One commentator observed that
"[i]n light of the 1984 amendment to Section 362(a)(3), it is extremely
difficult to deny that a freeze of a debtor's account does not constitute '[an]
act . . . to exercise control over property of the estate.' "88
This argument, however, may prove too much. For example, no one
85 Id. at 986.
86 Id. at 983. One commentator notes:
If this were Camelot, these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would, by themselves, im-
pose the "freeze." Bankers would not put administrative holds on debtors' bank accounts,
and debtors would not attempt to withdraw funds from the accounts without the bank's
permission or a court order obtained upon showing adequate protection.
Groschadl, "Freezing" the Debtor's Bank Account: A Violation of the Automatic Stay?, 57 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 75, 77 (1983).
87 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988) states, in pertinent part:
The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate.
Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever
held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
" Comment, Freeze And Recoupment: Methods For Circumventing The Automatic Stay?, 5
BANKR. DEV. J. 85, 91-92 (1987).
[Vol. 7
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can reasonably question that a creditor has authority to deny a debtor
access to cash collateral, property of the estate which often serves as the
lifeblood of a successful reorganization. Section 363 gives the creditor this
right even though the right to refuse to consent to the debtor's use of cash
collateral may arguably be "[an] act ... to exercise control over property
of the estate."89 Furthermore, nowhere is the Section 363 right to refuse
consent to use of cash collateral specifically excepted from the automatic
stay in Section 362(b).
The criticisms leveled by the Wildcat court at the actions of the bank
could be equally leveled against any creditor who failed to consent to the
debtor's use of cash collateral. In the typical cash collateral situation, the
secured creditor makes "the initial determination" of what constitutes cash
collateral. One cannot help but embrace the Wildcat court's own words at
this point: A secured creditor's refusal to consent to the debtor's use of
cash collateral "is essentially an extra-judicial temporary restraining or-
der." 90 Such refusal, however, is undeniably a right granted to the creditor
by the Code.
The Wildcat court also failed to address the potential liability, im-
plied by Section 542(c), of a creditor who pays prepetition debts from the
debtor's account after receiving notice that the debtor has filed a bank-
ruptcy petition.9 Although Section 542(c) protects a creditor who, with-
out knowledge or notice of commencement of the case, transfers property
of the estate, one implication of Section 542(c) is that if the creditor trans-
fers property of the estate after it receives notice of the filing, it does so at
its own peril. In order to protect itself from liability to the trustee for the
transfer of property of the estate after commencement of the case, the
creditor has no other alternative but to freeze the debtor's account. This is
true even in situations where the creditor has no right to setoff.
B. Cases Holding that the Freeze Does Not Violate the Stay
The competing line of cases has held that effecting an administrative
" In re Wildcat Constr. Co., 57 Bankr. 981, 986 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).
Id,
. 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1988) provides:
Except as provided in section 362(a)(7) of this title, an entity that has neither actual notice
nor actual knowledge of the commencement of the case concerning the debtor may transfer
property of the estate, or pay a debt owing to the debtor, in good faith and other than in
the manner specified in subsection (d) of this section, to an entity other than the trustee,
with the same effect as to the entity making such transfer or payment as if the case under
this title concerning the debtor had not been commenced.
1990]
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freeze to protect a creditor's right to setoff does not violate the automatic
stay. In Kenney's Franchise I1,92 the district court, in reversing the bank-
ruptcy court, held that the funds in possession of a creditor who has a
right to setoff against those funds, but for the automatic stay, are cash
collateral as defined in Section 363."3 In Kenney's Franchise II, the bank,
upon learning of the filing of a Chapter 11 petition, froze the debtor's
checking account. The bank did not apply the proceeds of the checking
account to satisfy the indebtedness.94 At the outset, the court noted that
the appropriate resolution of the issue involved consideration of not one,
but a number of provisions of the Code.95 "Accordingly, while section 553
is the statutory provision dealing with setoff, 'the withholding or freezing
of funds subject to a setoff claim is addressed by section 542, the provision
governing the turnover of property to the estate.' "96
The court relied heavily on In re Carpenter's9 7 analysis of Section
542(b). Section 542(b) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity that
owes a debt that is property of the estate and that is matured, payable on
demand, or payable on order, shall pay such debt to, or on the order of, the
trustee, except to the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553
of this title against a claim against the debtor.
The Carpenter court, referring to Section 542(b), reasoned:
The use of the phrase may be offset clearly contemplates that the setoff
right has not been exercised. Obviously, if the debt had been setoff, it could
not be considered property of the estate. Thus, Congress has recognized a
significant distinction between the withholding of payment and the exercise
of the setoff right. . . . [Subsection (c) absolves] banks ...of liability to
trustees for paying checks prior to knowledge of the filing. The statement in
the legislative history of that subsection [c] that it does not 'permit bank
setoff in violation of the automatic stay' is not applicable to [Section] 542(b)
and, in any event, is not inconsistent with this analysis. ...
This court is of the opinion that in a liquidation case the withholding
or "freezing" of funds subject to a valid setoff claim does not violate the
92 Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank (In re Kenney's Franchise Corp.), 22
Bankr. 747 (W.D. Va. 1982) (hereinafter Kenny's Franchise II).
93 Id. at 749.
9" Id. at 747.
'5 Id. at 748.
'6 Id. (citation omitted).
97 Third Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 14 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
[Vol. 7
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automatic stay of [Section] 362(a)(7), provided that a complaint seeking re-
lief from the stay is filed promptly thereafter. If banks are unable to follow
such a procedure, they either must make frantic ex parte applications to the
bankruptcy courts for relief from the stay or sit by and watch debtors dissi-
pate funds subject to setoff rights recognized in [Section] 553.9'
The Kenney's Franchise II court was further persuaded by the credi-
tor's argument that Section 363 of the Code governed the question at is-
sue. Under the Section 363 analysis, the court initially concluded that Sec-
tion 363(a) specifically includes deposit accounts within the definition of
cash collateral.9" Moreover, the court observed that Section 363(c)(2) pro-
vides that the trustee may not use cash collateral without the authorization
of the bankruptcy court.1"' The deposit account was cash collateral pursu-
ant to Section 363; therefore, the bank acted properly in not allowing the
debtor to use the checking account without prior court approval."0
As noted, Kenney's Franchise H relied heavily on In re Carpen-
ter.' In re Carpenter was a Chapter 7 case and the Carpenter court
was careful to note that its holding was limited to a liquidation situation.
Kenney's Franchise II, however, was a Chapter 11 reorganization case.
The sparse legislative history on this precise topic attempts to draw a dis-
tinction between setoff in a reorganization case vis a vis a liquidation
case.
x0
In the typical Chapter 11 situation, reorganization is the paramount
goal. From a Chapter 11 debtor's perspective, the goal of reorganization is
frustrated when funds are withheld, a situation which achieves the same
result as setoff in that it deprives the debtor of the use of the funds for
reorganizing.' 0 4 Again, this argument may prove too much. If the creditor
possesses a consensual secured claim in the funds in an account, Section
363 gives it the right to withhold consent to use of the funds until the
debtor obtains a court order." 5 A creditor's withholding of consent would
"Id. at 407 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
" Kenney's Franchise I1, 22 Bankr. at 749; see Freeman, Setoff Under the New Bankruptcy
Code: The Effect on Bankers, 97 BANKING L.J. 484, 506 (1980).
10 Kenny's Franchise II, 22 Bankr. at 749.
101 Id.; see In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 Bankr. 617, 620 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982).
lot Third Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 14 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1981).
1*1 See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 183-84, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6143-6145.
104 Comment, supra note 88, at 96-97.
lot See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1988).
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necessarily frustrate the goal of reorganization; nevertheless, such action is
clearly permitted. One cannot help but question why the Section 363
analysis should differ because the genesis of the secured claim is statutory
as opposed to consensual.
A similar result was reached in In re Edgins.'0 6 In In re Edgins, a
Chapter 13 case, the court cogently observed that the resolution of the
issue of whether an administrative freeze violates the automatic stay in-
volves an assessment of the interaction of the provisions regarding the au-
tomatic stay, 10 7 setoff,'0 8 turnover of property of the estate,109 determina-
tion of secured status," 0 and use of cash collateral."' After reviewing the
relevant sections, the court reached the conclusion that the Code imposes a
stalemate as to the use of funds in which a creditor asserts a right to
setoff.
When a creditor defers payment pursuant to an asserted right to setoff, the
creditor is not entitled to actually setoff the deferred funds, which would be
a violation of [Section] 362. In turn, the debtor is not permitted to use cash
collateral without first obtaining court authority and after notice and
hearing.1 '
The court explored the many cases on this particular issue and dis-
missed the criticisms against the Kenney's Franchise II"' line of cases.
The court observed that "[i]n this type of situation, banks are not so much
making a determination of ownership as they are giving notice to the
debtor that they claim an interest in the funds and intend to prevent dis-
sipation of the bank's claimed interest pending the court's determination
of ownership."" 4 The court further observed that the reasoning of In re
Cusanno"5 as to the effect of Section 362 was dicta because the case was
decided on the basis that the property was not subject to setoff. Moreover,
106 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Edgins (In re Edgins), 36 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1984).
1 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
S11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1988).
110 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
111 1 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1988). See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Edgins (In re
Edgins), 36 Bankr. 480, 483 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
112 In re Edgins, 36 Bankr. at 483.
Il 22 Bankr. 747 (W.D. Va. 1982).
114 In re Edgins, 36 Bankr. at 484.
115 Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank (In re Cusanno), 29 Bankr. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1983), vacated and
remanded, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984).
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the court believed that the Cusanno line of cases was not persuasive be-
cause it placed the burden on the wrong party. " 6
Creditors with a valid right of setoff under [Section] 553 would be required
to turn over to the debtor funds subject to setoff and thereafter attempt to
obtain an order from the court to preclude the debtor from improvidently
dissipating the funds. This will, all too often, be an attempt to lock the barn
door after the horse has been stolen. The shield of [Section] 362, which is
procedural and vests no intrinsic interest in property to the estate, should
not be used as a sword to divest other parties of legitimate interests in prop-
erty particularly where the debtor has the knowledge and means to bring
whatever claim he may have for use of the funds on for prompt hearing."
In a cryptic dissent, Judge Ashland concluded that the administrative
freeze was tantamount to a setoff and that the bank must either ask for
relief from the automatic stay or run the risk of violating it.118
In In re Owens-Peterson, 9 the court explored the freeze issue in the
context of Chapter 13.120 After concluding that the funds subject to setoff
are indeed cash collateral as defined in Section 363, the court held that the
creditor could freeze the funds to protect its setoff right.1 " Dismissing the
contention advanced by the debtor that a freeze is inconsistent with the
Chapter 11 and 13 goals of reorganization, the court observed:
[tihe conclusion [that the freeze does not violate the stay] . . . potentially
imposes a burden on a debtor undergoing reorganization under Chapter 13
or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Yet, this result is inescapable once
the Court determines that the bank account in dispute constitutes cash col-
lateral under [Section] 363(a). 22
i"e In re Edgins, 36 Bankr. at 484.
117 Id.
1" Id. at 485 (Ashland, J., dissenting).
.. Georgia Fed. Bank v. Owens-Peterson (In re Owens-Peterson), 39 Bankr. 186 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1984).
1 o A Chapter 13 case concerns itself with the reorganization of an individual with a regular
income. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (1988) (definition of an "individual
with regular income").
" In re Owens-Peterson, 39 Bankr. at 190.
122 Id. at 189. The court also stated an obvious, but often overlooked, fact of bankruptcy practice.
The court is optimistic that a majority of the disputes over bank deposits will be resolved
by consent of the parties as provided in § 363(c)(2)(A) rather than by the debtor's racing to
appear before the court for authorization to use cash collateral under § 363(c)(2)(B).
Id. at 189-90. Experience bears this observation out. One should not, however, come away with the
impression that bankruptcy practitioners are benevolent souls. To the contrary, both creditor and
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Therefore, the creditor could protect its cash collateral by imposing a
freeze without fear of violating the automatic stay."2s
In In re Hoffman,2 4 the bankruptcy court explored the issue of
whether an administrative freeze violated the automatic stay in the context
of both a Chapter 7 and a Chapter 11 case. After carefully reviewing the
law on the automatic stay, turnover, and setoff, the court decided that the
funds on deposit that were subject to setoff were indeed cash collateral.125
The court stated:
[t]he term "lien" as used in [Section] 506(a) is defined broadly at [Section]
101(31) to mean "any charge against or interest in property to secure pay-
ment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Consequently an allowed
claim may be a secured claim regardless of whether the lien was created by
agreement, statute, or judicial process. Additionally, under [Section] 506(a)
an allowed claim is treated as a secured claim to the extent of the amount of
the property in which the estate has an interest subject to setoff under [Sec-
tion] 553 with respect to such allowed claim, even if the holder of such
allowed claim does not have a perfected security interest in property in
which the estate has an interest. 126
Moreover, the court observed that payment of post-petition checks consti-
tuted a transfer of property of the estate. If this transfer was not author-
ized by the Code, it could be set aside pursuant to Section 549(a). 27 Sec-
tion 542 protects a bank that transfers property of the estate to third
persons if the transfer is made in good faith without notice of the bank-
ruptcy filing. By implication, if a bank transfers property of the estate
debtor attorneys have their clients' interests at heart when they fashion an agreed cash collateral
order. Creditor's counsel believes she can usually extract more from the debtor in terms of adequate
protection than she can obtain from the court. Moreover, there is no term greater feared by creditor
counsel than the term "indubitable equivalent" as a means of adequate protection for the use of cash
collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(c) (1988). Of course, debtor's counsel is concerned the court may
conclude there is no hope of reorganization and nip any effort in the bud, or worse, fashion an
adequate protection order as a precondition to the use of cash collateral that ends the show.
122 See In re Owens-Peterson, 39 Bankr. at 190.
124 Hoffman v. Portland Bank (In re Hoffman), 51 Bankr. 42 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985).
125 Id. at 47.
226 Id. at 45-46 (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 506.4 (15th ed. 1985)).
117 Id. at 46. Section 549(a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid a
transfer of property of the estate-
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and
(2) (A) that is authorized only under section 303(0 or 542(c) of this title; or
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.
11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1988).
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after it receives notice of the filing of a petition, it does so at its own
peril.128 The court concluded that these provisions illustrate the extent of
a bank's dilemma and the reasonableness of an administrative freeze
under the circumstances. 29 The Hoffman court further noted that the
substantial effect of a post-petition administrative freeze was to preserve,
not alter, the status quo and, therefore, was neither a direct nor indirect
attempt to improve the bank's right to distribution of estate assets.'80 The
court, however, failed to address the responsibility the Code imposes on a
bank to turn over funds to the trustee pursuant to Section 542(a) and (b).
Additionally, the Hoffman court concluded that a distinction exists
between Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 cases. In a Chapter 11 case, the
debtor has a need for the use of its cash collateral. While the debtor
should be prohibited from using the funds unless the bank is furnished
adequate protection,"3' there is no reason to totally deny access to the
funds. Nevertheless, there exists no reason for denying relief from the stay
in a Chapter 7 case when the right of setoff does not exist, once the trus-
tee is made a party.' 2
The seminal case in concluding that an administrative freeze does not
violate the automatic stay is In re Williams.3 ' In Willams, after observ-
ing the conflicting provisions of the Code, Judge McConnell concluded
that the bank's effecting an administrative freeze did not violate the auto-
matic stay because funds in a deposit account subject to a bank's right to
setoff constitute cash collateral.' 3 4 Under the Williams analysis, a bank
which possesses a right to setoff has the authority under Section 363 to
withhold consent to the debtor's use of the cash collateral. It then becomes
incumbent upon the debtor to seek approval of the bankruptcy court to
use the cash collateral, and, in return, provide some approved means of
adequate protection of the bank's secured claim.' 5
What is most interesting about the Williams opinion is not necessa-
rily its holding, for there already existed a line of cases which held that
the imposition of an administrative freeze did not violate the automatic
128 In re Hoffrman, 51 Bankr. at 46; see In re Smith Corsets Shops, Inc., 696 F.2d 971, 976-78
(1st Cir. 1982).
... In re Hoffman, 51 Bankr at 46.
130 Id.
" See, e.g., In re Archer, 34 Bankr. 28, 30 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983).
In re Hoffman, 51 Bankr. at 47.
Williams v. Am. Bank of the Mid-Cities, N.A. (In re Williams), 61 Bankr. 567 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1986).
134 Id. at 571-72.
"ll Id. at 572.
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stay, but rather the analysis by which the holding was reached. After re-
viewing the seemingly conflicting provisions of the Code, the Williams
court reached its conclusion by employing long-standing statutory rules of
construction to attempt to harmonize the provisions. Specifically, the court
embraced the statutory canon of construction that "where there is in the
same statute a specific provision, and also a general one which in its most
comprehensive sense would include matter embraced in the former, the
particular provision must control, and the general provision must be taken
to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within
the provisions of the particular provision."' 6 In this case, the court rea-
soned that the specific permission granted to a creditor by Section 542(b)
to retain funds subject to setoff should prevail over the general restriction
found in Section 362(a)(3) and (a)(7) against post-petition setoffs. 13 To
buttress this analysis, the court discounted Section 362(a)(3), which pro-
hibits any act to exercise control over property of the estate. The court
stated that Section 362(a)(3) only forbids a creditor's acts to exercise ex-
clusive control over property of the estate. 3" This conclusion is peculiar.
"It is unclear from where the court adopts the 'exclusive' restraint on
control as the Code clearly does not limit the control to situations where it
is exclusive."' 39
The court in In re Air Atlanta, Inc."4 embraced the Williams rea-
soning that the more specific provision of Section 542(b), which allows a
creditor to retain funds subject to setoff, should control over the more gen-
eral restrictions of Section 362(a)(7), prohibiting setoffs, and subsection
(a)(3), prohibiting acts to exercise control. 4 ' The court further embraced
the Williams holding that the burden should be on the debtor to obtain
permission to use cash collateral, and that the bank should not have to
turn over funds to the debtor and thereafter request the court to prohibit
the debtor from dissipating the funds. 4
In a break with a long line of tradition, the court in In re New York
City Shoes,'4" recognizing that in Pennsylvania a freeze is a setoff, never-
I36 d. at 573 (quoting 73 Am. JUR. 2D Statutes § 257 (1974)).
137 Id.
138 Id.
13' Comment, supra note 88, at 99.
140 Nat'l Bank v. Air Atlanta, Inc. (In re Air Atlanta, Inc.), 74 Bankr. 426 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.),
affd, 81 Bankr. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
141 Id. at 427.
.42 Id. Accord Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp. v. Crestar Bank (In re Craddock-Terry Shoe
Corp.), 91 Bankr. 392, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Va. 1988).
143 78 Bankr. 426 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
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theless concluded that where the debtor is authorized to operate a busi-
ness, the creditor may freeze the account. 44 While paying homage to
Pennsylvania law, including a long line of bankruptcy precedent peculiar
to Pennsylvania, the court nevertheless held:
The Cusanno holding that an "administrative freeze" constitutes a setoff is
correct, given the status of Pennsylvania law regarding bank setoffs. Hence,
a bank must obtain relief from the automatic stay pursuant to [Section]
362(a)(7) to consummate a setoff or to proceed to "administratively freeze"
all funds except those pertinent to which it has a security or quasi-security
interest which would prevent a business debtor from utilizing cash
collateral.145
The court distinguished between cases involving business debtors and
cases involving consumer debtors. 46 In the former case, a freeze is appro-
priate until the debtor can provide adequate protection to the creditor or
the creditor establishes its setoff right.'47 In the consumer debtor situation,
a freeze is inappropriate and the creditor violates the stay even if the cred-
itor possesses a valid right to setoff pursuant to Section 553.48 The court
failed to discuss why the creditor of a consumer debtor is not entitled to
adequate protection of its secured claim. 49
There exists a subset of the second line of cases which embraces a
middle of the road view as to the resolution of this issue. These cases
essentially conclude that an administrative freeze does not violate the auto-
'" Id. at 432, 433.
"I Id. at 432.
146 Id.
147 Id. Apparently, the court imposed on the debtor the duty to provide adequate protection to
dissolve the freeze, but seemed to suggest that it is incumbent upon the creditor with a setoff right to
move to determine the status of the funds. Id. at 431-32. A more troubling aspect of the court's
opinion is the dictum that the burden on the debtor to establish adequate protection "might be dimin-
ished in relation to that imposed upon a debtor attempting to utilize the cash collateral of a classic,
heavily-secured creditor." Id. at 433. While there is some support for this proposition in the legisla-
tive history, see H.R. REP,. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 430, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6385-6386, there is no support in the Code itself.
14' In re New York City Shoes, 78 Bankr. at 432. The court employed a literal reading of §
363(c) which limits itself to cases in which the debtor is authorized by the court or the Code to engage
in business. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1988).
14' While § 363(c) may support a distinction between business debtors and consumer debtors,
there is no such distinction made in § 506(a). The setoff right is classified as a matter of federal law
as a secured claim to the extent of funds legitimately subject to setoff, regardless of whether the debtor
is engaging in a business or not. It follows that if the claim is secured, the creditor is entitled to




matic stay if, shortly after the administrative freeze is effected, the creditor
files a motion to terminate the stay under Section 362(d). 5 '
In In re Crispell,151 the court concluded that while the imposition of
an administrative freeze does not in itself violate the stay, the continuation
of that freeze for any extended period of time would constitute a setoff in
violation of Section 362(a)(7). 5 The court reached that conclusion be-
cause of its belief that a continuation would have the same substantive
effect as a setoff. 5 The court agreed with the bank's claim that the funds
on deposit on the date of bankruptcy were cash collateral against which
the bank clearly had a right to setoff. However, the court noted that the
setoff right was waived when the bank released the funds.154 Nonetheless,
the court inexplicably failed to recognize that if funds in a deposit account
are indeed cash collateral, then the impetus is on the debtor to gain access
to those funds, absent consent from the creditor. The court failed to ap-
preciate the subtle yet significant distinction it had drawn.
V. APPLICATION OF THE CASH COLLATERAL PARADIGM
For a thorough resolution of the issue presented in this article, no
less than six substantive provisions of the Code must be carefully consid-
ered. The first provision is the automatic stay provision found in Section
362. Specifically, Section 362 prohibits the act of setoff and any act to
exercise control over the debtor's property. 5 The second provision is Sec-
tion 553. That provision recognizes a creditor's state-created right to setoff
and delineates procedures whereby the right may be exercised. 5 The
third provision is Section 506(a), which defines a creditor's right to setoff
as a secured claim to the extent of the value of the collateral, i.e., the total
amount of funds subject to setoff. 5 The fourth section which is relevant
is Section 363(c), which delineates the rights and duties of both a creditor
and a debtor to the use of cash collateral.' 5  The fifth provision is Section
542(b).' 59 That provision directs parties to turn over to the trustee funds
150 See, e.g., Third Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 14 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1981).
151 Crispell v. Landmark Bank (In re Crispell), 73 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987).
152 Id. at 379-80.
153 Id. at 379.
15 Id. at 380.
15 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) & (a)(7) (1988).
156 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
157 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
158 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1988).
5- 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1988).
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that are property of the estate except to the extent such funds may be
offset. Finally, Section 542(c) implicitly makes a creditor liable for mak-
ing any post-petition transfer of the debtor's property without consent of
the bankruptcy court.' All of these provisions must be analyzed before a
proper resolution of the issue can be reached.
The issue of whether the administrative freeze violates the automatic
stay thrusts the bankruptcy courts into a maelstrom involving state and
federal law and several provisions of the Code which honestly cannot be
harmonized. Attempts to read the various statutes consistently conjure up
Emerson's caution that foolish consistencies are the hobgoblin of simple
minds.
One must first decide that the statutes are, in fact, in conflict. Regret-
tably, that is an all too simple task. One need only read a smattering of
cases to reach the conclusion that the system as it exists today is "broken."
Moreover, while the In re Williams analysis is sound, its use of the statu-
tory canon of construction may not be. The court in In re Williams.6
employed the statutory canon of construction that a specific provision of a
statute overrides a general provision of a statute. Employing a different,
although equally applicable canon of construction than that employed in
In re Williams, would have indicated the opposite result. That is, the
canon that when two provisions are inconsistent the more recent provision
controls the resolution of an issue. This canon would direct the court to
reach the conclusion that the administrative freeze does violate the auto-
matic stay.
The easy answer is to amend the Code to fix the problem of inconsis-
tent provisions. Until that day, judges must grapple with the issue. The
answer to the problem must rest on a judge's assessment and ranking of
the underlying goals of bankruptcy.
The line of cases which hold that the imposition of an administrative
freeze violates the automatic stay promotes the sound policies embodied in
the automatic stay provision of the Code, even at the expense of disregard-
ing the rights created by state law and recognized by the Code. This line
of cases, however, is indefensible. Disregarding a creditor's state-created
interest is not a legitimate goal of the automatic stay.' 2 The automatic
stay does not eviscerate the rights of creditors, but instead, simply stays
enforcement of those rights pending an orderly examination of the debtor's
:60 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1988).
" 61 Bankr. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
12 See supra note 18.
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and the creditor's rights.'6" The purposes of the automatic stay have gen-
erally been to protect the debtor from acts taken by its creditors and to
protect a creditor from another creditor's acts without court approval.
Neither of these purposes is furthered by the application of the automatic
stay provision to the administrative freeze situation. Moreover, this line of
cases completely ignores the Code's undeniable policy of rewarding a
creditor who declines to setoff before the bankruptcy petition is filed. The
Code holds out a carrot to such a creditor by permitting him a secured
claim to the extent of the funds subject to setoff, disregarding any bona
fide prepetition increase in the account. It is foolish to hold out a carrot to
a creditor and then penalize him when he bites. Furthermore, this line of
cases promotes prepetition setoff; there is an incentive for creditors with a
right to setoff to exercise that right during a period of financial difficulty
of the debtor rather than continue to carry the debtor in hopes that mat-
ters will improve.164 Thus, these cases promote an atmosphere in conflict
with the technical complexities and conceptual underpinnings of modern
bankruptcy law on setoff.
The middle ground approach to the issue, while laudable and entic-
ing, is no more supported by the Code than the former approach."6 5 If
funds on hand are truly cash collateral, then the Code has already pro-
vided, pursuant to Section 363(c), that the impetus is on the debtor to
obtain access to those funds. The attempt by the courts, and the commen-
tators, to rewrite that provision in a backhanded manner is unconvincing.
After all, it is undeniable that failure to consent to the use of cash collat-
eral, other than in the context of an administrative freeze, is not a viola-
tion of the automatic stay. A setoff right is a non-consensual claim created
by state law. The Code makes the claim a secured claim as a matter of
federal law. It makes no sense, and it is unsupported in the Code, to craft
a distinction concerning who has the burden of determining the status of
funds on whether a claim is created by statute, judicial process, or consent.
The legislative history contemplates that a right to setoff is to be treated
essentially the same as any other security interest. "[A]n amount that may
be offset is tantamount to a security interest for the benefit of the credi-
'1' H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6298.
... See CLARK, supra note 27, 6.05[2][a] at 6-64; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 183, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6143-44.
' "Omne ignotum pro magnifico." A. Conan Doyle, The Red-Headed League, ANNOTATED
SHERLOCK HOLMES 418, 421 (W.S. Baring-Gould ed. 1967) (Sherlock Holmes' only full Latin quo-
tation to be found in the Canons is singularly appropriate).
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tor." ' Requiring the debtor to seek relief merely forces the debtor to do
what it is required to do by Section 363.
Therefore, the resolution of the issue of whether an administrative
freeze is a violation of the automatic stay is left to the third line of cases
which has held that the Section 363 cash collateral analysis is the control-
ling paradigm. That paradigm recognizes that a setoff is a violation of the
automatic stay. The paradigm also recognizes that the right to setoff is a
secured claim to the extent of the value of the funds subject to the setoff.
The paradigm further recognizes that there must be some means to pro-
tect the secured claim created by state law while permitting a method by
which the debtor, in appropriate circumstances, may gain access to the
cash collateral. Section 363 neatly provides the answers and the appropri-
ate allocation of the rights and duties of the debtor and its creditors.
The application of the cash collateral paradigm to the administrative
freeze makes sense. The funds are property of the estate. The funds are
also cash collateral as defined by Section 363. The creditor with a right to
setoff against .hose funds has a secured claim to the extent of those funds
under Section 506(a). The debtor has two means by which to obtain ac-
cess to the funds. The debtor can obtain consent of the creditor holding a
right to setoff in those funds. Absent consent, the debtor must obtain a
court order to gain access to those funds. The approval of access to those
funds by the court will rest necessarily on the debtor's providing adequate
protection to the creditor's secured claim. This adequate protection is de-
fined by Section 361 of the Code and may include periodic payments from
another source or a replacement lien equal to the value of the right to
setoff. 
1 7
The administrative freeze does not generate a new problem. The
"I H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 183, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6143-44. While recognizing the obvious differences between a right to setoff and
an Article 9 security interest, the legislative history nevertheless observes that the analogy "is adequate
to justify giving an offsetting creditor the same protection as the bill gives to secured creditors gener-
ally." Id. See CLARK, supra note 27, 6.05(2)(a) at 6-61.
167 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988). Adequate protection is purposefully vague. Section 361 consists of
examples of adequate protection given to illustrate possible alternatives. Chief among these examples
are the replacement lien, periodic cash payments, or the "indubitable equivalent" of the secured credi-
tor's interest in the property. Case law and experience strongly suggest that valuation problems will
frequently result in protection that is less than adequate. See e.g., In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367
(2d Cir. 1971); In re Yale Express Sys., 38 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967). The legislative history clearly
contemplates that a creditor entitled to setoff mutual prepetition debts is entitled to adequate protec-
tion like any other creditor holding a secured claim. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
183, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6143-44; 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY 361.01[4] at 361-15 (15th ed. 1988).
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problem has existed since the beginning of contests between debtors and
creditors over the use of cash collateral. The Code has attempted to re-
solve those tensions by striking a balance between the creditor's interest on
the one hand, and the debtor's interest on the other. That balance applies
equally to the administrative freeze situation. Moreover, the cash collat-
eral paradigm is consistent with the powerful creditor's bargain heuris-
tic.""8 The cash collateral paradigm accords substantial respect to state-
created rights while accommodating conflicting Code provisions. The par-
adigm recognizes that it need not necessarily be an all or nothing game.
The cornerstone of the creditors' bargain heuristic is that pre-bank-
ruptcy state created rights should not be impaired purely for distributional
goals. Rather, impairment of pre-bankruptcy state-created rights is legiti-
mate only when it is necessary to maximize the pool of assets available to
satisfy the claims of the creditors as a group."' The heuristic recognizes
that bankruptcy is a foreseeable risk, borne by each creditor of the debtor.
Each individual creditor assesses its own risks in case of its debtor's bank-
ruptcy. The assessment of the risk of bankruptcy necessarily influences
each creditor's decision to require security and to set the terms of financ-
ing. 70 Unsecured creditors forego security and assume a higher risk than
secured creditors, but are theoretically compensated by a higher return
and shorter terms of repayment. Secured creditors purchase pre-bank-
ruptcy rights as a hedge against the risk of bankruptcy by accepting a
lower rate of return in exchange for security. 17  The central premise of
the creditors' bargain heuristic is that state law differences in treatment of
secured and unsecured creditors should be honored by modern bankruptcy
168 See generally Jackson, supra note 18.
166 See Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 727-31 (1984); Jack-
son, supra note 18, at 868-71. Professor Jackson observes that because of the increased aggregate pool
of assets when the reorganization value of the debtor's estate exceeds its liquidation value, unsecured
creditors should receive a greater return without harm to the secured creditors. Jackson, supra note
18, at 861-64; see Note, The Proper Discount Rate Under The Chapter 11 Cram Down Provision:
Should Secured Creditors Retain Their State Law Entitlements?, 72 VA. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (1986).
170 In this context, security is recognized not only as a monitoring device that allows secured
creditors to police a debtor's activities to detect misbehavior, see Jackson & Kronman, Secured Fi-
nancing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1153 (1979), but also as a means of
establishing priority over other creditors. Accord Note, supra note 169, at 1502.
11 See Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. OHs. L.
REv. 97, 112 (1984). State law recognizes that a secured party's claim has priority over an unsecured
party's claim. See U.O.C. § 9-301(1)(a) (1987). All creditors, at least those who choose to deal with a
debtor, are intimately aware of these ground rules. See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 965.
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law. 17 2 The creditor with a setoff right possesses a cognizable pre-bank-
ruptcy state law right similar to the Article 9 secured party. Moreover,
the ability to setoff in the future is often a bargained for right of the
creditor at the inception or reworking of the debt. It may serve as a form
of security, warranting a creditor's concession on loan terms. Typically,
setoff rights do not arise accidentally; they are not a windfall. Instead,
setoff rights often comprise part of the loan package.
17 1
The creditors' bargain heuristic is defensible on two related, though
independent, grounds. First, the heuristic dissuades the strategic use of
bankruptcy by certain creditors. 7 When bankruptcy law recognizes a
different method of the distribution of entitlements than state law, ban-
krutpcy law creates perverse incentives that motivate parties to use the
bankruptcy process strategically." 5 Some creditors will, therefore, opt for
bankruptcy because their return is greater under bankruptcy law than
under state law.' 71 This maneuvering leads to inefficiency and generates
unnecessary costs.'7 Uniformity between state law and bankruptcy law
minimizes thq strategic use, or threat of use, of the bankruptcy forum,
alleviating these concerns.
Second, secured parties must generally participate in the bankuptcy
process for it to have maximum utility.' 78 With perversions in the credit
172 Almost all bankruptcy law to date accords substantial respect to non-bankruptcy state-created
rights. See Jackson, supra note 18, at 859 & n.15. But see United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988) (undersecured creditor not entitled to lost opportunity cost arising from
a stay of its right to foreclose).
"7 Typically, a bank may demand that in return for providing funds, the debtor agree to main-
tain its operating account at the bank. This situation allows for setoff rights and the creditor's ability
to monitor its debtor. There is nothing inherently unfair about recognizing bargained for rights. See
Baird & Jackson, supra note 171, at 112; Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 965. But see McCoid, supra
note 24, at 37-43. (Professor McCoid questions setoff as a bargained-for right).
174 Note, supra note 169, at 1503.
"6 See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 958.
17 An illuminating example of this situation can be found in Texas. Under Texas state fraudu-
lent transfer law, the bid price at a noncollusive, nonjudicial, regularly conducted foreclosure sale
establishes reasonably equivalent value as a matter of law. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
24.004(b) (Vernon 1988). Therefore, the foreclosure sale is immune from attack as a constructive
fraudulent conveyance. A different result may be reached under bankruptcy law. If the bid price at a
foreclosure sale is not greater than seventy percent of the fair market value of the property, and the
debtor was also insolvent at the time of the transfer, then the foreclosure sale which is lawful under
state law can be avoided under the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988); see Durrett v. Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647
F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
77 See Note, supra note 169, at 1502-03.
M7 This does not necessarily mean that secured creditors must benefit from a bankruptcy. They
usually do not. Rather, this proposition requires only that the secured creditor remain indifferent to
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system traceable to interpretations of the Code, secured creditors will not
willfully participate in bankruptcy. At the first sign of financial distress,
the dismantling of the debtor would begin. The utility of bankruptcy is
measured by the fruits of a collective process. Bankruptcy is a collective
forum. Its goal must be to increase total creditor wealth generally by for-
cibly keeping intact the debtor's going concern value and by invalidating
certain pre-bankruptcy transfers and other individual collection efforts. 1 9
The cash collateral paradigm addresses these concerns. Unlike the
Kenney's Franchise Pso line of cases, the paradigm does not generate per-
verse consequences. The creditor's right to setoff remains intact to the ex-
tent permitted under state law and the Code. The strategic use of bank-
ruptcy law is dissuaded. Moreover, the cash collateral paradigm makes
the creditor with setoff rights at least indifferent to the use of the collective
efforts embodied in the Code. However, in a jurisdiction where the freeze
is proscribed, the creditor with setoff rights is harmed by resort to the
bankruptcy process. It may lose its right to setoff. The unintended result
is that the creditor with setoff rights in those jurisdictions would setoff at
the first signs of the debtor's serious financial distress-a result completely
at odds with the stated purposes of Section 553.
The use of the cash collateral paradigm may be attacked on two
fronts. First, one can attack the paradigm because Section 363 by its terms
is limited to business reorganization situations. Thus, the paradigm breaks
down in a Chapter 7 or 13 case because generally no business reorganiza-
tion is involved. Second, the paradigm may be susceptible to an attack
built on Section 362(a)(3). Section 362(a)(3) proscribes any act to exercise
control over the debtor's property. In defending the paradigm, it is diffi-
cult to argue that effecting an administrative freeze is not an act to exer-
cise control over the debtor's property. Each perceived chink in the cash
collateral paradigm's armor will be addressed in turn.
By its terms, Section 363(c) is limited to business reorganization situ-
ations. Thus, it appears that the paradigm does not apply to Chapter 7 or
13 cases. Nonetheless, the paradigm implicitly covers the Chapter 7 situa-
tion. The Code strikes a balance between the debtor's interest in reorga-
the bankruptcy process. See Note, supra note 169, at 1503-06.
279 Of course, it is generally the unsecured creditors, and possibly the owners, who most dramati-
cally benefit from the collective process.
10 12 Bankr. 390 (W.D. Va. 1981). An unsecured creditor will prefer bankruptcy in jurisdic-
tions which follow the Kenney's Franchise I rule where a creditor possesses a substantial setoff right
because a creditor who is unable to freeze the account may forever lose its setoff right while the debtor
attempts to make a go of the enterprise.
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nizing and the creditor's interest in specific collateral. The result struck is
the allocation of the rights and duties embodied in Section 363(c). Why,
then, would the procedure be more favorable to a debtor in a Chapter 7
case when the debtor's interest in reorganizing is nonexistent, leaving only
the creditor's interest as the remaining legitimate factor? The legislative
history recognizes this result, stating that "[i]n a liquidation case, any set-
off that occurs after the commencement of the case has no effect on the
debtor ... [i]t will not interfere with the debtor's operation or business in
any way, because the debtor has already gone out of business. 1 8 Thus,
the paradigm survives this attack largely because it is superficial.
There is, however, merit to the argument that the cash collateral par-
adigm weakens in the Chapter 13 scenario. There, one confronts the reor-
ganization goal in a different context; instead of the reorganization of a
business, Chapter 13 concerns itself with the reorganization of an individ-
ual's debts. While the paradigm is still persuasive in that it strikes a bal-
ance between legitimate debtor and creditor interests, one cannot deny
that Section 3.63(c) limits itself to business reorganizations. Thus, a court
cannot blindly apply the paradigm because of this apparent glitch. The
court, nevertheless, should analogize to the Chapter 11 cases, embracing
the cash collateral paradigm even though it may not neatly fit into the
Chapter 13 scenario. The reason for this approach rests on the role that
adequate protection plays in the contest over the use of cash collateral.
The linchpin of the cash collateral paradigm is that for the debtor to
gain access to certain funds in which a creditor asserts a secured claim, it
must generally provide to the creditor some form of adequate protection.
Absent consent, a debtor is not entitled to use cash collateral without pro-
viding adequate protection to the creditor who claims an interest in the
cash collateral. Why should this creditor protection be unavailable in the
Chapter 13 case? In the Chapter 13 case, the cash collateral paradigm
permits the debtor to use cash collateral, but he must pay a price to do so;
the price the Code extracts from the debtor is adequate protection.
The second method by which the cash collateral paradigm may be
attacked rests on the 1984 amendments to Section 362. These amendments
prohibit any act to exercise control over the debtor's property.' The
:1 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 183, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6143-44.
,82 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988). Section 362(a)(3) is a logical counterpart to §§ 542 (turno-
ver of property to the estate) and 543 (turnover of property by a custodian) which aid the trustee in
obtaining property of the estate from third partie -. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.04[31 at 362-
35 (15th ed. 1988).
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court in In re Williams"' grappled with this issue but unfortunately
dodged the import of the amendments by employing a covenient canon of
construction. One author invokes the 1984 amendments to support his
conclusion that the freeze may violate the automatic stay in appropriate
circumstances.18
4
The problem with reading Section 362(a)(3) broadly is that the sec-
tion can swallow whole many provisions in the Code that protect credi-
tors. For example, a creditor's failure to consent to the use of cash collat-
eral under Section 363 in the typical cash collateral situation may be
viewed as exercising control over the debtor's property.18 5 Such a result
was certainly not intended by Congress. Congress was well aware of the
conflicting cases on the freeze issue before it enacted the 1984 amend-
ments. It should have spoken with a clear voice if it meant to proscribe the
use of the freeze. Its failure to do so highlights the fact that the purpose of
Section 362(a)(3) was not to proscribe the use of the freeze, but rather to
aid the bankruptcy trustee in obtaining property of the estate from third
parties under Sections 542 and 543 and to prevent the dismemberment of
the estate." 6
CONCLUSION
Greek legend tells of a bandit named Procustus who guarded a
mountain pass, stopping all travelers on their way. He had a bed and
would force the traveler to lie on it. If the traveler was too tall for the bed,
Procustus cut off his legs; if the traveler was too short, Procustus stretched
the traveler out, pulling out his legs and arms until he fit. The adminis-
trative freeze is a Procustus bed; each relevant Code section is like the
unwary traveler in Procustus' day. None seem to fit the bed just right.
The Code contains a mechanism by which the contest between a
creditor possessing a right to setoff and the debtor whose funds are subject
to setoff can be resolved. Section 363(c) of the Code provides the appropri-
ate paradigm. Furthermore, the policies of the Code embodied in Sections
363(c), 506(a), 542, and 553 are furthered by the application of the cash
collateral paradigm. While furthering the policies embodied in those sec-
185 61 Bankr. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
184 See Comment, supra note 88, at 106.
188 Accord 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.04 at 362-41 - 362-42 & n.30(a) (15th ed. 1988).
See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 341, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 6297-98.
I" See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.04 at 362-35 (15th ed. 1988).
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tions, the cash collateral paradigm does not hamper the policies embodied
in Section 362 of the Code. The creditor cannot setoff its claim without
relief from the automatic stay. The debtor is not denied access to the funds
without recourse. Rather, the debtor has the two alternatives provided for
in Section 363(c). The paradigm does not lock out the debtor from access
to its funds. The cash collateral paradigm does not compromise the auto-
matic stay principle by balancing it with the setoff, turnover, and cash
collateral principles. The paradigm accommodates it.
The issue of whether the administrative freeze violates the automatic
stay has engendered considerable judicial debate. What many of the cases
have failed to recognize is that the resolution of the issue calls into ques-
tion the essence of the tension between a debtor and its creditors in bank-
ruptcy. In a Chapter 11 or 13 case, and to some extent in a Chapter 7
case, the debtor must be able to tap as many resources as possible. Cash
collateral is the lifeblood of a successful reorganization. However, the ar-
guments that may be advanced by a debtor in attempting to persuade a
court that an. administrative freeze violates the automatic stay are argu-
ments that apply equally to any form of cash collateral contest. The Code
provides a mechanism by which the debtor can attempt to alleviate the
harm of the denial of the use of its funds in which a creditor has a secured
interest. It is this avenue of redress to which the debtor must turn.
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